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Guatemala’s Historical Clarification Commission: 





In the Latin American country of Guatemala, the latter half of the 
twentieth century signified a tumultuous period of conflict and 
dictatorship that left all sectors of the nation in shambles following 
the end of the Cold War and subsequent emergence of 
democratization as a widespread phenomenon. What has been 
characterized as a thirty-year civil war ended in 1994, with the 
introduction of peace talks between the Guatemalan government and 
the main rebel faction, Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca (URNG).1  The long, drawn-out talks produced many 
outcomes for the transition of Guatemala into a democratic state, 
among them the creation of the Commission for Historical 
Clarification (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, or CEH).2  
The CEH was unique because it was the first time in the 
history of the country that an official body had accused the 
government of genocide being perpetrated during the civil war.3 The 
nation was also unique, given the multitude of actors involved in the 
perpetuation of conflict. The government, military, and rebel groups 
were the most obvious parties involved in negotiating a peace for 
Guatemala. However, behind the scenes were the efforts of civil 
                                                 
1 Leah Barkoukis and Charles Villa-Vicencio, “Truth Commissions: a Comparative 
Study,” Conflict Resolution Program, Georgetown University, Washington DC and 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, August 2011, 1. 
2 Amy Ross, “The Creation and Conduct of the Guatemalan Commission for 
Historical Clarification,” Geoforum 37, (2006), 74. 
3 Christian Tomuschat,  “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 23.2 (May 2001), 234.  
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society, comprised of various different groups, as well as the Catholic 
Church. Each of these actors played a unique role in bringing about 
the CEH. Moreover, they also played varying roles in the conduct of 
the commission. Finally, each group involved in the CEH were 
impacted differently by its outcomes. Therefore, this paper takes the 
approach of examining each of these groups one at a time, in order 
to highlight their experiences with regard to the creation, 
implementation, and effects of the CEH’s findings. 
 Overall, by discussing these groups, this paper seeks to 
analyse the effectiveness of the Historical Clarification Commission 
in Guatemala.  Set against both the short- and long-term objectives 
of the CEH, this paper will analyse the roles of the government, the 
army, and the rebel movement against the short-term goals of 
achieving accountability for the atrocities that occurred, and 
eliminating the culture of impunity in Guatemala.  The long-term 
goals of peace and democracy are analysed by looking at the roles of 
the Catholic Church and the many different factions of civil society 
and how they were affected by the CEH. Ultimately, this paper 
argues that the CEH has been somewhat effective in achieving its 
short-term goals of accountability and elimination of impunity. 
However, the path to lasting peace and democracy has a long way to 
go, as seen through the reactions and emerging movements among 
civil society and the Catholic Church. 
 
The Historical Clarification Commission as a form of Restorative Justice 
Before examining the CEH and its actors in depth, it is useful to 
briefly recall key concepts and principles in transitional justice 
concepts and principles. The CEH is commonly accepted to be a 
truth commission (TC), which is a mechanism of restorative justice. 
Truth commissions are defined as “temporary bodies, usually with an 
official status, set up to investigate a past history of human rights 
violations that took place within a country during a specified period 
2
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of time.”4 Under optimal conditions, TCs have the ability to facilitate 
positive change in a post-conflict society.  While there is no “one size 
fits all” description of a truth commission, they generally seek to first 
and foremost establish the truth about the past. Other goals that are 
relevant to the CEH include fostering accountability for perpetrators 
of human rights violations, recommending necessary legal and 
institutional reforms, and helping to consolidate a democratic 
transition.5 Absent from these stated objectives are the details of the 
negotiated compromise that result in the creation of mechanisms 
such as TCs. This is especially relevant to the case of Guatemala, as 
the negotiating parties, in framing the CEH, also created the powers 
and constraints under which it operated.6 
 
Context: Guatemala’s Path to Transitional Justice 
The end of the 1980s marked the close of many military-dominated 
regimes in Latin America. The principle of the “right to truth” 
became an emerging concept during this time, as civil society groups 
pushed governments to become accountable for their actions during 
the past decades of civil war.7 Accountability, as the activists saw it, 
was the answer to the culture of secrecy and impunity generated by 
decades of conflict and human rights violations. 
Guatemala’s first attempt at a truth commission occurred in 
1985, before the end of the civil war. Under the military dictatorship 
of General Mejia Victores, a commission was formed to investigate 
disappearances that had taken place in the country. Before it could 
interview its first witnesses, the commission was disbanded citing that 
it was “it was impossible to determine the whereabouts of the people 
                                                 
4 Patrick Ball and Audrey R. Chapman, “The Truth of Truth Commissions: 
Comparative Lessons from Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 23.1 (February 2001), 2. 
5 Mark Freeman and Joanna R. Quinn, “Lessons Learned: Practical Lessons 
Gleaned from Inside the Truth Commissions of Guatemala and South Africa,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 25.4 (November 2003), 1120. See article for complete list of 
goals of TCs to 2003. 
6 Ross, “The Creation and Conduct of the Guatemalan Commission for Historical 
Clarification,” 73. 
7 Ibid., 71.  
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claimed to be disappeared.”8 The topic of human rights and a truth 
commission were not brought up in earnest again until the Oslo 
Peace Accords in 1994. In June of that year, the Guatemalan 
government and the URNG signed accords in Oslo, Norway which 
mandated the creation of a “Commission for the Historical 
Clarification of Human Rights Violations and Other Acts of Violence 
that Have Caused the Suffering of the Guatemalan People.”9  
The CEH did not start its work until the closing day of the 
Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace in 1996, after which it was 
to have six months (with a possibility of extending a further six 
months) to complete its mandate.10 Overall, the CEH investigated 
more than 7,500 cases derived from interviews and documented a 
total of 24,910 killings.11 On February 25, 1999 the CEH presented 
its information publicly in the form of a report entitled Guatemala: 
Memory of Silence (henceforth referred to as “the CEH report”). The 
report found that the State was responsible for 93% of the more than 
600 massacres document in its 3500 pages.12 The report concluded 
that while the state and rebel groups were the main perpetrators, the 
consequence of state policies of intolerance, exclusion, and racism 
implicated Guatemalan society as a whole.13 
 In its recommendations, the CEH report called for the State 
to apply the National Reconciliation Law by criminally prosecuting 
and convicting the perpetrators of genocide, torture, and forced 
disappearances.14 Overall, it was hoped that the CEH’s findings and 
recommendations would promote a move towards prioritizing 
human rights and democratization of the state.15 However, this was 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 73. 
9 Ross, “The Creation and Conduct of the Guatemalan Commission for Historical 
Clarification,” 74. 
10 Tomuschat,  “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 241. 
11 Ball and Chapman, “The Truth of Truth Commissions,” 8. 
12 Ross, “The Creation and Conduct of the Guatemalan Commission for Historical 
Clarification,” 79. 
13 Jan Perlin, “The Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission Finds 
Genocide,” ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 6 (1999-2000), 396. 
14 Ibid., 412. 
15 Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 240. 
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not the case. At least in the immediate months following its release, 
scholars found that the CEH report did not affect political change in 
Guatemala.16 In the short-term, the creation, implementation and 
outcomes of the CEH faced challenges of accountability and 
eliminating the culture of impunity in Guatemala.17 In the long-term 
the CEH and its legacy face the difficult task of establishing a 
peaceful and democratic society. 
 
The CEH in the Short-Term: Seeking Accountability and Elimination of 
Impunity 
Having established the context for its establishment, this section will 
now look at the roles of the government, army, and UNRG in the 
creation, implementation, and outcome of the CEH. The country has 
only been at “peace” for nineteen years, and therefore it is difficult to 
analyse the effectiveness of the CEH in its long-term goal of 
establishing a peaceful and democratic nation. However, the short-
term goals of accountability and elimination of impunity can be 
determined by closely examining the roles of government, army, and 
rebel groups. 
 One of the main points of agreement between these groups 
that led to its creation was the CEH’s policy of not naming names in 
its final report. This generated widespread concern that the 
commission would actually encourage the culture of impunity that 
had been rampant in wartime Guatemala.18 As an already-integrated 
component of Guatemala’s politics, impunity was seen as interfering 
with a TC achieving its goals of producing a consensus history, 
promoting reconciliation, and ending violence.19 This culture of 
                                                 
16 Kathleen Dill, “Reparations and the Illusive Meaning of Justice in Guatemala,” in 
Waging War, Making Peace: Reparations and Human Rights, edited by Barbara Rose 
Johnston and Susan Slymovics (Walnut Creek, California: Left Coast Press, Inc., 
2009), 187. 
17 Ross, “The Creation and Conduct of the Guatemalan Commission for Historical 
Clarification,” 69. 
18 Ibid., 74.   
19 Anita Isaacs, “At War with the Past? The Politics of Truth Seeking in 
Guatemala,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 4 (2010): 254. 
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impunity, according the CEH report, took control of the very 
structure of the state, becoming both a means and an end.20 Scholars 
point out that even the Accords, including the CEH that resulted, 
were thwarted by political groups—the government, army, and rebel 
groups—who sought to avoid prosecution and punishment.21  This 
culture of impunity has the effect of making grassroots participation 
more difficult. For example, the process of achieving justice from 
gendered violence is affected by impunity.  Those who experienced 
rape and other crimes against women during the civil war are afraid 
to seek out justice given that they lived “next door” to perpetrators, 
especially in rural communities.22 
 While the CEH and other post-conflict measures have 
worked to battle this culture of impunity, it persisted in Guatemalan 
society decades after the end of the war.  Between 2000 and 2008, the 
Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office in Guatemala registered over 
1,300 attacks on “truth defenders,” which the office defines as 
“individuals who either furnish evidence about atrocities or who 
publicly demand accountability.”23 While this is hardly the kind of 
statistic ideally found in a society transitioning to democracy, it is still 
a step up from Guatemala’s previous record of genocidal violence. 
Molina-Mejia asserts that the political/psychological dimension of 
impunity has been weakened, in part due to the work of the CEH. 24 
 Using these goals of accountability and eliminating impunity 
as a basis for analysis, this paper will now examine each of the groups 
directly involved in the Oslo Peace Accords, which allowed for the 
creation of the Historical Clarification Commission in Guatemala. 
 
                                                 
20 Anika Oettler, “Encounters with History: Dealing with the ‘Present Past’ in 
Guatemala,” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 81 (October 
2006), 12. 
21 Raul Molina-Mejia, “The Struggle Against Impunity in Guatemala,” Social Justice 
26.4 (Winter 1999), 68.  
22 Alison Crosby and M. Brinton Lykes, “Mayan Women Survivors Speak: The 
Gendered Relations of Truth Telling in Postwar Guatemala,” The International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 5 (2011), 462. 
23 Isaacs, “At War with the Past?” 270.  
24 Molina-Mejia, “The Struggle Against Impunity in Guatemala,” 66.  
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International Actors – The United Nations  
During its formation as well as its operation, the UN provided on-
going support to the commission.25 Specifically, the UN Human 
Rights Observer Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) was 
instrumental in the facilitation of peace negotiations by acting as a 
mediator.26  Other than the Secretary-General’s appointment of 
German lawyer Christian Tomuschat as one of the commissioners, 
the UN was essentially uninvolved in the CEH investigation and 
report. The UN viewed the CEH as being based on an agreement 
between the Government of Guatemala and the guerrilla 
organization, and was not a UN institution.27 Therefore while it is 
important to mention their involvement, this paper will not be 
analysing the United Nations as a key actor in the CEH’s creation, 
implementation, and outcome. 
 
The State: Government of Guatemala 
The 1999 CEH report concluded that “the violence [in Guatemala] 
was fundamentally directed by the State against the excluded, the 
poor and above all, the Mayan people, as well as against those who 
fought for justice and greater social equality.”28 The “State” in this 
instance refers to the government, as the ideological backing, as well 
as the army, as the physical manifestation of the government’s 
attacks. This section will discuss specifically the government of 
Guatemala, which includes its political parties and leaders, both past 
and present.  This paper’s analysis of the government supports the 
argument that accountability was achieved through the publication of 
the CEH report. However, the second short-term goal of eliminating 
impunity has not been significantly sought after. As scholars Audrey 
Chapman and Patrick Ball assert, the CEH emerged out of a 
                                                 
25 Laurel E. Fletcher, Jamie Rowen and Harvey M. Weinstein. “Context, Timing 
and the Dynamics of Transitional Justice: A Historical Perspective,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 31.1 (February 2009), 177. 
26 David A. Crocker, “Transitional Justice and International Civil Society: Toward a 
Normative Framework,” Constellations 5.4 (1999), 511. 
27 Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 248. 
28 Ball and Chapman, “The Truth of Truth Commissions,” 32. 
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negotiated settlement where “the architects of violence and abuses,” 
or the government, still retained political influence and power.29   
 From the beginning of the CEH’s implementation, the 
government proved to be a difficult party to deal with. In September 
of 1997, the CEH wrote to the President, Álvaro Arzú, requesting 
detailed information regarding four prominent cases of 
disappearances in the history of the country.30 Commissioner 
Tomuschat recalled that the government did not respond to said 
request, stating that the letter “got lost.”31 Such is an example of the 
government’s failure to face accountability from the start of CEH’s 
investigations. 
 Nonetheless, the CEH was able to conduct its investigations 
without a great deal of assistance from the government.  In its 1999 
report, the CEH sought to demonstrate that, within the central 
power structure of the state, under the control of the various leaders 
in the bureaucracy, specific commands were given to essentially be 
prepared for anything. Tomuschat contends that “anything” in this 
case referred specifically to forcible disappearances, murder, and 
torture.32 Therefore the report directly implicated the government in 
Guatemala’s decades of violence—an example of the achievement of 
accountability in a public forum. The leaders in government were 
labeled “intellectual authors” of the violence by the CEH report; it 
was these men who ordered communities to be massacred, and 
genocide to be committed33 without any regard for the consequences 
on human rights or democracy as a whole. The short-term goal of 
accountability was therefore aggressively addressed by the CEH’s 
investigations. 
 On the other hand, the outcome of the CEH report was a 
step back in achieving accountability.  As the commission’s results 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 12. 
30 Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 249. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid., 251. 
33 Rachel Hatcher, “Truth and Forgetting in Guatemala: An Examination of 
Memoria del Silenco and Nunca Mas,” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean 
Studies 34.67 (2009), 147. 
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were being presented on February 25, 1999 it was reported that 
President Arzú “appeared stunned.”34 Three weeks after, Arzú posted 
a full-page statement in the Guatemalan press repudiating many of 
the commission’s recommendations.35 Moreover, the government 
also declined to establish many of the CEH’s recommendations, 
including a follow-up to the CEH itself.36 The failure to be 
accountable was not just within the office of the President. Many 
other politicians outright dismissed the CEH’s findings immediately 
following the report’s publication.37 Thus, while the short-term goal 
of accountability was addressed by the government’s creation of the 
CEH, its role in the commission’s implementation and report showed 
a vehement lack of accountability on the part of Guatemalan 
leadership. 
 Even though the presiding regime was not directly involved 
in any of the atrocities investigated by the CEH, the Arzú 
administration, in denying the findings of the CEH report, were in no 
way excused for their denial of accountability.  Therefore, the leaders 
in power when the massacres occurred were even less excusable for 
their actions during their reign. However, as illustrated above, 
impunity permeated the Guatemalan political atmosphere. General 
Efrain Rios Montt was one of the dictators responsible for the 
massacres that occurred in the 1980s.38 A few days after the CEH 
report was published, General Montt defended the accusations of his 
regime’s “scorched earth tactics” by pointing the finger at the 
guerrilla army, who he claims used civilians as human shields.39  In 
doing this, Montt denied all accountability for his actions, as well as 
the actions of the Guatemalan government at the time of the 
                                                 
34 Greg Grandin, “Chronicles of a Guatemalan Genocide Foretold: Violence, 
Trauma, and the Limits of Historical Inquiry,” Nepantla: Views from the South 1.2 
(2000), 408. 
35 Elizabeth Oglesby, “Educating Citizens in Postwar Guatemala:   Historical 
Memory, Genocide, and the Culture of Peace,” Radical History Review 2007.97 
(January 2007), 78. 
36 Isaacs, “At War with the Past?” 254.  
37 Grandin, “Chronicles of a Guatemalan Genocide Foretold,” 408.  
38 Ball and Chapman, “The Truth of Truth Commissions,” 35.  
39 Oettler, “Encounters with History,” 8.  
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massacres. Montt’s position also demonstrates the culture of 
impunity in Guatemala. In November 1999, less than a year after the 
CEH report was released, Montt won the Guatemalan elections in a 
landslide victory and became the leader of the country once again.40 
The fact that the very leader accused of genocide by the CEH 
became the next President of Guatemala demonstrates just how 
much impunity still existed in Guatemala. Along with the denial of 
accountability, this impunity caused the government of Guatemala to 
lack legitimacy, despite the workings of the CEH. Therefore, while in 
the short-term, the CEH worked towards the goals of accountability 
and eliminating impunity, the actions of government leaders in 
Guatemala essentially overturned the work of the commission and 
slowed the process of transition into a democratic country. 
 
                                                 
40 Ball and Chapman, “The Truth of Truth Commissions,” 35. 
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The State: Guatemala’s Armed Forces  
As the strong arm of the dictatorial governments that ruled during 
the civil war, the army was the direct perpetrator of the Guatemalan 
genocide.  In addition to the Armed Forces, were the paramilitary 
groups known as Civil Defense Patrols (PACs), which were made up 
of civilian personnel recruited by the army to commit the atrocities. 
PAC leaders were directed to “defend” their communities against the 
guerrilla groups; some of the members were forced to commit 
atrocities against their will.41 (Henceforth, both the PACs and Armed 
Forces will be referred to as “the army,” unless otherwise indicated.) 
This is because it is often hard to distinguish which group were the 
perpetrators in any given witness’ testimonial. Similar to the 
government leaders mentioned above, the army denied all 
accountability of the genocide in the implementation and outcome of 
the CEH. 
The military possessed large amounts of data that the CEH 
might have utilized in its investigation. However, the army did not 
release a great number of these records. Following the publication of 
the CEH report in 1999, some of the records were released from a 
secret military archive. These records described the fate of 200 
victims who were “disappeared” by the military.42 Because these 
records were released after the publication of the report, they were 
not included in the CEH’s investigation and recommendations. It is 
estimated that these records were just a small portion of the data that 
has since likely been hidden or destroyed.43  The military contended 
that the CEH had “no right” to see their archives, a viewpoint that 
Tomuschat labels “a deliberate strategy of obstruction.”44 
The army’s denial of accountability was displayed most 
prominently after the CEH report was published. According to the 
report: 
                                                 
41 Julie Stewart, “A Measure of Justice: The Rabinal Human Rights Movement in 
Post-War Guatemala,” Qualitative Sociology 31 (July 2008), 236. 
42 Ball and Chapman, “The Truth of Truth Commissions,” 5.  
43 Ball and Chapman, “The Truth of Truth Commissions,” 5. 
44 Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 250.  
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During the armed confrontation, the State’s idea of the 
“internal enemy”, intrinsic to the National Security Doctrine 
[…] became the raison d’être of Army and State policies for 
several decades. […] the CEH discovered [that] state forces 
and related paramilitary groups were responsible for 93% of 
the violations documented by the CEH...45 
 
In addition to these findings, the CEH recommended army reforms 
that included the purge of human right violators. It also called for a 
new training doctrine in lieu of the “internal enemy” doctrine that 
had seen so much death as a result.46 In response, the government 
claimed that the army had already been reorganized and purged. It 
therefore essentially ignored these recommendations.47 In addition to 
refusing to follow through on the CEH’s recommendations, the 
military denied the findings of the CEH.48 The armed forces claimed 
that not a single one of their units had acted wrongly or violated the 
rules outside of the context of war.49  When they did come forward, 
members of the army told stories of insurgent abuse and generally 
placing blame on guerrilla groups. By encouraging their soldiers to 
testify in this manner, the military aimed to portray its soldiers as 
victims rather than aggressors.50 
By denying the findings of the CEH, the Guatemalan army 
also denied accountability for its actions. Therefore, the short-term 
goal of accountability was not achieved with respect to the military in 
Guatemala. Moreover, by refusing to implement most of the CEH’s 
recommendations which included an internal purge of the 
perpetrators of genocide, the army continued to participate in the 
                                                 
45 La Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, Guatemala:  Memoria del 
Silencio (Guatemala:  UNOPS, 1999). 
46 Rachel Sieder. “War, Peace, and Memory Politics in Central America,” in The 
Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, edited by Paloma 
Aguilar, Alexandra Barahona de Brito, and Carmen Gonzaléz-Enriquez. (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2001),  185. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 250.  
49 Ibid., 251. 
50 Isaacs, “At War With the Past? “264.  
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culture of impunity. Given that the CEH found the army to be 
responsible for 93% of the atrocities under investigation, this was an 
extremely large setback in Guatemala’s movement towards a peaceful 
and democratic society. 
 
Rebel Groups: URNG 
The National Guatemalan Revolution Unity (URNG) was the main 
rebel faction responsible for battling government forces throughout 
the civil war. By the mid-1980s, the URNG, after keeping up the 
fight for many decades, found themselves severely weakened as a 
military force.51 Therefore, when the opportunity arose for peace 
talks in 1994, the URNG was more than willing to attend. Although 
the proposed truth commission presupposed blame on both sides of 
the civil war, scholars contend that this might have proved beneficial 
for the URNG.52 One of these reasons was that it would give the 
rebels a greater amount of agency because it put them on a level 
playing field with the armed forces.53 Therefore, even though this 
playing field was based on mass atrocities, the rebel groups would be 
addressed with similar agency to the army. 
 Understandably, the guerrilla organization was much more 
cooperative than the Government and armed forces during the 
implementation of the CEH’s investigations. They openly 
acknowledged responsibility, and therefore showed accountability for 
their crimes. Specifically, the URNG admitted responsibility for the 
Aguacate massacre, where twenty-two farmers were executed for no 
evident reasons.54 However, similar to the testimonies of the armed 
forces, guerrilla forces were limited in their willingness to share their 
stories. More often than not, URNG members focused their 
testimonies on experiencing or witnessing military atrocities, instead 
of explaining their own actions during the conflict. In the instances 
that they did describe their own actions, rebel witnesses took time to 
                                                 
51 Sieder, “War, Peace, and Memory Politics in Central America,” 167. 
52 Ross,  “The Creation and Conduct of the Guatemalan Commission for Historical 
Clarification,” 74. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 252.  
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explain the extenuating circumstances that led them to take action.55 
Therefore, while they were the most accountable of the three groups 
directly involved in the creation of the CEH, they were not 
completely willing to reveal their role in the massacres that occurred 
during the civil war. 
 Regardless of the URNG’s unwillingness to reveal their true 
experiences, the CEH was able to shape a narrative that implicated 
both sides in the civil war. The report demonstrates that the 
guerrillas’ record was in no way cleared of the massacres, executions, 
and kidnappings characteristic of decades of civil war. The CEH 
report reminds its audience that the URNG, as an active party in the 
civil war, was obliged, at the very least, to respect international 
human rights law.56 Quantitatively, the report found that: 
Acts of violence attributable to the guerrillas represent 3% 
of the violations registered by the CEH. This contrasts with 
93% committed by agents of the State, especially the 
Army... However, …this disparity does not lessen the 
gravity of the unjustifiable offences committed by the 
guerrillas against human rights.57 
 
Therefore, the CEH held the URNG accountable for their 
actions during the civil war by highlighting the gravity of their 
violations. 
 Impunity is much more difficult to measure in terms of 
rebel groups, because they were not given special privilege 
above the law, as were the government and army. Christian 
Tomuschat points out that the URNG has since transformed 
itself into a political party.58 On the positive side, the 
organization no longer utilises force to overthrow the 
government’s actions, and has limited its extremist views. 
However, although it has experienced a transformation, the 
                                                 
55 Isaacs, “At War With The Past?” 263.  
56 Commission for Historical Clarification, Memory of Silence, Section II. Paragraph 
127. 
57 Ibid.,  Section II. Paragraph 128. 
58 Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 234.  
14







79   Guatemala’s Historical Clarification Commission 
 
Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review, Vol.4, Iss.1, 2013, 65-87 
 
URNG will always be associated with the atrocities that 
occurred during the civil war. Therefore, awarding them public 
office, given their poor human rights record, can in itself be 
seen as a continuance of the culture of impunity. Compared to 
the government and army, however, the URNG remains the 
best exemplar of accountability and elimination of impunity in 
the short-term period following the release of the CEH’s 
report. 
 As a whole, the groups directly involved in the creation 
of the CEH contributed somewhat to the short-term 
transitional justice objectives of accountability for the atrocities, 
as well as the elimination of impunity. The government, in 
shaping the CEH, was addressing its accountability, but took a 
step back when it denied the report’s findings. The army fared 
worse, in both denying accountability and continuing with 
impunity. The URNG, seeking parity with other powerful 
actors, was the most compliant and accountable. But all three 
actors can be seen to have continued to contribute to the 
culture of impunity in Guatemala. In the short-term, 
transitional justice has been achieved in a limited sense. The 
next section’s examination at the long-term goals of the CEH, 
as seen through the analysis of the Catholic Church and civil 
society’s role, will measure of the effectiveness of the CEH as a 
transitional justice mechanism in post-war Guatemala. 
 
The CEH in the Long-Term: Seeking a Peaceful and Democratic Society 
Determining a transitional justice mechanism’s effectiveness in 
the long-term is a difficult task. In the Guatemalan case, 
analysing the CEH’s effectiveness in the long-term does not 
specify a window of time in which to analyse the commission. 
Given that is has been almost two decades since the beginning 
of peace talks, this paper utilizes some scholars’ more recent 
findings to analyse the effectiveness of the CEH in the long-
term. Moreover, since the CEH was negotiated in a top-down 
fashion, the immediate effects and actions were analysed using 
the higher-up groups in the social structure of Guatemala—the 
15
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government and army. If effective, the CEH’s legacy should 
eventually trickle down to the groups at the bottom of this 
social hierarchy—nongovernmental organizations such as the 
Catholic Church, and civil society, comprised of indigenous 
groups, human rights activists, as well as women’s movements. 
Therefore, actions and reactions of these groups following the 
CEH report’s publication are analysed in detail against the long-
term goal of achieving a peaceful and democratic society. 
 Guatemalan society has come a far way from the 
undemocratic policies, violence, and destruction characteristic 
of the civil war era. The CEH, as a catalyst for democratic and 
peaceful change in Guatemala, demonstrated in a tangible way 
how the State was undemocratic. Therefore, the CEH directly 
contributed to a more peaceful society.59 However, studies 
show that many Guatemalans did not find that the CEH and its 
outcomes brought an end to the violence. While genocidal 
violence no longer occurs, scholars have pointed to an increase 
in the incidence of common crimes in Guatemala.60 Moreover, 
observers are quick to point out the continued presence of 
armed military personnel throughout the country— an 
indicator of the country’s “incomplete transition to a civilian-
controlled democracy.”61 Laura Arriaza and Naomi Roht-
Arriaza criticize the CEH as a short-term truth seeking 
mechanism that is not capable of garnering widespread trust 
among the people; for these scholars, national-level initiatives 
such as the CEH must be accompanied by other mechanisms in 
order to be efficient in the long-term, especially in rural areas.62 
                                                 
59 Perlin, “The Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission Finds Genocide,” 
395. 
60 Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, “Lynchings and the Democratization of Terror in 
Postwar Guatemala: Implications for Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 24.3 
(August 2002), 643. 
61 Michael K. Steinberg and Matthew J. Taylor, “Public Memory and Political 
Power in Guatemala’s Post-Conflict Landscape,” Geographical Review 93.4 (October 
2003), 464. 
62 Laura Arriaza and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Social Reconstruction as a Local 
Process,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (2008), 157. 
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The ineffectiveness of the CEH in the short-term caused 
groups such as the Catholic Church and civil society to embark 
on their own efforts of justice, as extensions of the CEH’s 
findings and recommendations. 
 In briefly examining the role of the Catholic Church 
and civil society, this paper argues that while it still has a long 
way to go, both groups have been instrumental in pushing the 
agendas of peace and democracy onto Guatemalan society. 
 
The Catholic Church and REMHI 
The 1994 peace talks provided a basis for Guatemalan society 
to seek out the truth for itself. Therefore, before the CEH was 
formed, the Catholic Church in Guatemala embarked on the 
Recuperation of Historical Memory Project (Recuperacion de la 
Memoria Histórica, or REMHI). As the CEH’s investigations 
took place, REMHI grew to be a project that filled in some of 
the gaps that existed in CEH’s mandate.63 Methodologically, 
REMHI served as a precedent for the CEH in terms of 
collecting testimonies and visiting rural communities.64 
 The church’s report, titled “Guatemala: Never Again!” 
(Guatemala: Nunca Mas!) was the result of 5,500 victim-survivor 
testimonies and was published before the CEH report, in April 
1998.65 The report accused the armed forces of genocide before 
the CEH report conclusively found the same.  
 As a constant during both times of war and peace, the 
Catholic Church served as a beacon of progress for those who 
sought to move society towards lasting peace and democracy. 
Scholar David Crocker asserts that non-governmental groups 
such as the Catholic Church help people survive repression or 
civil war and then begin the onerous process of 
democratization.66 Because it did not rely on the CEH or its 
                                                 
63 Hatcher, “Truth and Forgetting in Guatemala,” 133. 
64 Ross,  “The Creation and Conduct of the Guatemalan Commission for Historical 
Clarification,” 75. 
65 Isaacs, “At War With the Past?” 260. 
66 Crocker, “Transitional Justice and International Civil Society,” 501. 
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findings, the Catholic Church was able to set in motion the 
process of democratization through its own unofficial truth 
commission. Moreover, as a pillar of morality, the Church and 
other religious organizations have the unique opportunity to 
facilitate reconciliation in post-conflict environments. Through 
its visits to rural communities and collection of testimonies, the 
Catholic Church was able to do just this. Therefore, while not 
directly connected to the CEH, the Catholic Church assisted in 
achieving such goals as reconciliation and a historical narrative. 
REMHI did not have the short-term mandate that CEH did, 
and having started before the latter commission did, the 
Catholic Church’s TC project has the potential to have long-
term effects towards the democratization of Guatemala. 
 
Civil Society: Human Rights Activists, Rural Communities, and 
Women’s Groups 
Literature on the CEH often cites Guatemala as unique because 
of the significant role played by civil society. However, there 
are conflicting views on civil society’s direct involvement in the 
formation of the CEH. Some scholars contend that civil society 
was bypassed in the negotiations.67 Others point to the role of 
the Assembly of Civil Society (ACS), a group comprised of 
many different representatives who submitted their positions 
on the CEH negotiations to the UN mediator.68 There seems to 
be a consensus on civil society’s instrumental role in passing the 
National Reconciliation Law, which excluded from the amnesty 
those who were accused of crimes against humanity as defined 
by international law.69 
 But the long-term effects of the CEH are seen in civil 
society through the actions of various groups including human 
                                                 
67 Isaacs, “At War with the Past?” 260. 
68  Crocker, “Transitional Justice and International Civil Society,” 503. 
69 Juan E. Méndez, “The Human Right to Truth: Lessons Learned from Latin 
American Experiences in Truth Telling,” in Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace 
Building in Post-Conflict Societies, ed. Tristan Anne Borer (Notre Dame: Indiana, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 115. 
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rights activists, rural communities, and women’s groups. Firstly, 
while opposing the CEH’s pro-amnesty mandate, human rights 
groups sought to push the CEH to its limits in terms of its 
capabilities.70 Moreover, several Guatemalan NGOs were seen 
as keeping public pressure on the CEH to name perpetrators 
and not merely profile patterns of human rights abuses.71 While 
the former goal was not achieved, these organizations, such as 
the human rights activists in the region of Rabinal, contributed 
to substantive features of democratization.72 Rabinal human 
rights groups asserted their rights and freedoms as Guatemalan 
citizens through such things as protests.73 In the long-term, 
these groups, empowered by the CEH and its findings, show 
promise to push the country’s agenda for democratization. 
 The second group within civil society assisting in the 
movement towards democracy in Guatemala were rural 
communities. These areas were directly affected by the 
atrocities addressed by the CEH. Therefore, in order for 
complete long-term transition into democracy to occur, these 
rural communities must come to terms with their experiences, 
and assert their rights as citizens—something the massacres 
intended to rob them of by physically obliterating the habitats 
of rural peoples in Guatemala. The most recent manifestation 
of the rural communities’ search for truth is houses of memory. 
Essentially miniature museums, these houses serve as a place 
for local groups to display customs and history and reference 
the massacres. Laura Arriaza and Naomi-Roht Arriaza contend 
that these houses continue the work of the CEH by continuing 
to unearth the historical narrative.74 Therefore, rural 
communities contribute to a more democratic society by 
continuing their search for truth. 
                                                 
70 Isaacs, “At War With the Past?” 259. 
71 Crocker, “Transitional Justice and International Civil Society,” 507. 
72 Stewart, “A Measure of Justice,” 246. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza, “Social Reconstruction as a Local Process,” 165. 
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 Finally, women’s groups are a part of civil society and 
have continued the work of the CEH to further their own path 
towards peace and democracy. Taking place in March 2010, the 
Tribunal of Conscience for Women Survivors of Sexual 
Violence during the Armed Conflict Guatemala was an 
unofficial TC organized by several civil society groups.75 The 
CEH report noted that violence against women was severely 
underreported and underexamined.76 Initiatives such as 2010’s 
Tribunal took the CEH’s findings and applied them in the long-
term to facilitate reconciliation in groups within civil society 
that were affected by the massacres. In this way, they contribute 
to democratization in the long-term by empowering these 
otherwise oppressed groups within Guatemalan society. 
 Both the Catholic Church and civil society groups 
shared an anger at the CEH’s truth-seeking process, which was 
seen as being self-serving to its framers (the government, army, 
and rebels), and as failing to address the needs of those most 
affected (civilians).77 They both utilized this anger to initiate 
their own measures of transitional justice, influenced negatively 
and positively by the CEH and its findings. Unlike the short-
term mandate of the CEH, these groups have been 
instrumental in implementing long-term change towards the 
ultimate goal of a peaceful and democratic Guatemalan society. 
 
Conclusion 
Above all, the CEH was instrumental in creating a basis for 
truth for Guatemalan society. Yet, the commission was careful 
not to place the blame on history itself. The CEH charged 
individual authors of violence—the government, army, rebels, 
and society-at-large—of the gross violations of human rights 
that occurred during Guatemala’s war torn years.78  Through an 
examination of the various actors involved in the creation, 
                                                 
75 Crosby and Lykes, “Mayan Women Survivors Speak,” 457. 
76 Ibid., 461. 
77 Isaacs, “At War With the Past?” 259.  
78 Grandin, “Chronicles of a Guatemalan Genocide Foretold,” 402. 
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implementation, and outcome of the CEH, this paper has 
analysed the short-term and long-term objectives of the CEH 
as a truth commission. This paper found that the government, 
army, and rebel group were at best partially effective in being 
accountable for their actions, and eliminating impunity.  In the 
long-term, this paper found that the Catholic Church and civil 
society contributed and continue to contribute significantly to 
the progress of democracy using their own mechanisms of 
justice, influenced by the CEH and its findings. As a whole, 
Guatemala has a come a long way from its violent and 
undemocratic society almost two decades ago. However, there 
is still much that needs to be done in the transitioning of 
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